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Can the new administration overcome the
Chicago and Harvard schools’ reservations?
Obama’s Antitrust
Agenda
BY DANIEL A. CRANE
University of Michigan
ntitrust law is back in vogue. After years
in the wilderness, antitrust enforcement
has reemerged as a hot topic in
Washington and in the legal academy. In
one heady week in May of 2009, a front-
page story in the New York Times report-
ed the dramatic decision of Christine
Varney — the Obama administration’s new Antitrust Division
head — to jettison the entire report on monopolization offens-
es released by the Bush Justice Department just eight months
earlier. In a speech before the Center for American Progress,
Varney announced that the Justice Department is “commit-
ted to aggressively pursuing enforcement of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.” As if to prove that “shock and awe” enforce-
ment against monopolists is still possible, two days later the
European Commission released its decision fining Intel near-
ly $1.5 billion for beating up on amd in the microprocessor
market. Suddenly, the antitrust community felt an electric cur-
rent that it had not felt in years.
At least five related forces are contributing to this appar-
ent resurgence of antitrust sentiment. First, the convention-
al view is that U.S. antitrust law has largely been in the grips
of a laissez faire “Chicago school” perspective for the last
quarter century. If history is a reliable teacher, antitrust
enforcement is cyclical — enforcement comes and goes. The
Chicago school may simply have run its cycle and the time
inevitably come for a more interventionist antitrust regime.
Second, much of the antitrust scholarship in the acade-
my over the last decade has taken a post-Chicago tilt, calling
into question Chicago’s anti-interventionist assumptions. A
recent collection of essays written by prominent economists
and law professors and edited by Bob Pitofsky, Bill Clinton’s
Federal Trade Commission chair, announces that the Chicago
A
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school “overshot the mark” and steered antitrust law in a “pro-
foundly wrong direction.” (See “The Trustbusters’ Revival
Misfires,” p. 50.) Academic sentiment tends to foreshadow
enforcement trends and judicial sentiment. The Chicago cri-
tique of the preexisting regime began in the 1950s, several
decades before Chicago became dominant in the courts and
antitrust agencies. So it is natural that the increasing barrage
of post-Chicago literature in the academy is beginning to
bear fruit in the real world of antitrust enforcement.
Third, for the first time in many years, a president has
actually shown some interest in antitrust enforcement. On
the campaign trail, then–Senator Obama actually gave
speeches dedicated to antitrust. He announced that he
would appoint “an antitrust division in the Justice
Department that actually believes in antitrust law” and
pledged increased enforcement in the pharmaceutical,
media, energy, and insurance sectors. President Obama’s
choices of Jon Leibowitz for chair of the ftc and Varney to
head the Antitrust Division give a nod to significantly
enhanced enforcement. In addition to repealing the monop-
olization report, the agencies are reportedly investigating
complaints by Verizon and at&t that major cable operators
like Cablevision and Comcast refuse to sell them
Cablevision- or Comcast-produced sports shows, contem-
plating an enforcement action against Google over its deal
to make more books available online exclusively with Google,
and calling for reinvigorated enforcement against branded
pharmaceutical companies that supposedly pay off gener-
ics makers to not bring competing drugs to market.
Fourth, the economic crisis has dealt a sharp blow to
laissez faire ideology and reinvigorated political support for
regulatory solutions. When prominent free marketeers like
Alan Greenspan and Richard Posner publicly blame the cri-
sis on insufficient regulation, the laissez faire ideological
commitments that undergird the Chicago School are obvi-
ously in considerable danger. Varney has gone so far as to sug-














gest that the economic crisis is partly attributable to lax
antitrust enforcement.
Finally, antitrust enforcement is growing exponentially
around the world. The European Commission is ever more
assertive in antitrust cases. As new antitrust regimes come
online in Asia and South America, they are increasingly invok-
ing the interventionist
European model rather than
the more conservative U.S.
model. In some circles, there
is a sense that to be relevant to
the exponential growth of
antitrust law around the
world and stop losing intel-
lectual market share to the
Europeans, the U.S. must be
more aggressive in enforcing
its own antitrust law. Even
apart from this competition
for inf luence with the
Europeans, there is the fact
that in the last two years new
antitrust regimes have begun
in significant economies like
China and India, and other
significant economies like
Brazil and South Korea have
grown increasingly assertive
in the enforcement of their
antitrust laws.
Despite all of the pro-
enforcement sentiment, there
are good reasons to believe
that reports of an antitrust
revival may be exaggerated.
For one, revival must follow
retrenchment, and antitrust
was never nearly so retrenched
as many believe. Second, the
Obama administration faces
major obstacles to any effort




that antitrust died during
Ronald Reagan’s administra-
tion, enjoyed a brief revival
during the Clinton adminis-
tration, and was knocked out
again during the George W.
Bush years is considerably off
the mark. For starters, that
perspective looks only at
enforcement actions by the
Department of Justice or
Federal Trade Commission. For many decades now, private
antitrust enforcement has been far more significant in numer-
ical terms than public enforcement. There are about ten pri-
vate cases for every public one. Those private cases net billions
of dollars in judgments or settlements annually and spur
the development of antitrust norms in the courts. Even if the
antitrust agencies chose not to engage in much antitrust
enforcement, that has a relatively small effect on the overall
level of antitrust enforcement because private cases do not
depend on the filing of public cases.
Further, it is not the case that recent Republican admin-
istrations have stopped enforcing the antitrust laws. In a
recent study, I showed that Department of Justice antitrust
case filings, adjusted for gdp, were roughly constant during
the Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton
administrations. The George W. Bush administration did
bring somewhat fewer cases, adjusted for gdp, than recent
administrations, but the decline was not significant enough
to declare, as Obama did on the campaign trail, that the
administration had forgotten about the existence of the
antitrust law.
What did change from administration to administration
was the kind of case that the agencies brought. In recent
decades, Republican administrations have prioritized fight-
ing price-fixing cartels. The George W. Bush administration
actually scored record or near-record levels of criminal anti-
cartel enforcement measured by number of jail days sen-
tenced, average jail sentences, jail sentences on foreign con-
spirators, aggregate criminal fines imposed, and number of
grand jury investigations. Given the consensus that cartels rep-
resent the most pernicious sort of anticompetitive behavior,
the Bush administration’s cartel program should count as a
major success.
Besides cartel cases, the other two major categories of
antitrust actions are merger reviews and monopolization
cases. The Bush antitrust agencies brought fewer merger
lawsuits than the Clinton administration, but the number of
lawsuits filed is a relatively small part of the story. Because
of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act’s pre-merger notification
requirement and the agencies’ power to significantly delay
merger closing by issuing “second requests” for documents,
very few controversial mergers get litigated. Most are resolved
informally through behind-the-scenes negotiations with the
agencies. To be sure, in recent decades it has been on average
easier to get a merger cleared in a Republican administration
than in a Democratic one, but it is far from true that
Republican administrations have simply abandoned merg-
er enforcement.
Perhaps the major difference between recent Democratic
and Republican administrations is that the Republican
administrations have been less likely to bring monopolization
cases like the Microsoft matter initiated by the Clinton Justice
Department, the Intel/amdmatter already adjudicated in the
European Union and under consideration at the ftc, or the
Google books deal under investigation at the Justice
Department. But there is a good reason that the government
does not have to be overly assertive about monopolization.
Unlike cartel cases that are often concealed until brought to
light through criminal investigation techniques and lenien-
cy tools, or merger cases where the harm is widely dispersed
over many consumers without much of an interest in suing,
monopolization cases have ready and willing champions in the
private sector. Aggrieved competitors and the private bar do
not hesitate to bring monopolization cases. There is less of a
need for government involvement since there are already so
many private monopolization cases.
There is no doubt that the Obama administration is try-
ing to up the tempo of antitrust enforcement. There is more
doubt as to whether the tempo was ever down.
BEYOND CHICAGO
Assuming that the tempo of antitrust enforcement was down
in recent years, there is a question as to the cause. Even if the
agencies were not bringing many actions, there were certain-
ly many private lawsuits. But those actions faced obstacles in
the courts.
A conventional account of U.S. antitrust jurisprudence
views U.S. courts as captured by a Chicago school ideology
that is committed to laissez faire principles and hence seeks
to roll back antitrust enforcement. The real story is consid-
erably more complicated. Modern U.S. antitrust law can be
understood as the product of two different schools — the
Chicago school of Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, Robert
Bork, Anthony Scalia et al., and the Harvard school of Philip
Areeda, Donald Turner, Herbert Hovenkamp, and Stephen
Breyer — who often leads the Supreme Court’s four liberal
Justices in antitrust cases. Both schools deeply mistrust many
of the institutional actors in the antitrust system. Although
the two schools also mistrust each other, more often than not
they reach common ground on outcomes.
The Chicago school tends to view antitrust enforcement
as only necessary to correct egregious market failures that
occur relatively rarely. It argues that many business practices
— such as tying arrangements, vertical integration, and aggres-
sive discounting practices — are competitively benign and
pro-consumer. It views markets as quickly correcting most
instances of competitive abuse. On the flip side, Chicago
distrusts many of the institutional aspects of antitrust enforce-
ment — particularly competitor plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ lawyers,
juries, and treble damages. It believes that, given the antitrust
system, the costs of falsely condemning pro-competitive
behavior are usually greater than the costs of falsely excul-
pating anticompetitive behavior.
The Harvard school is considerably less trusting of markets
and more trusting of regulatory solutions. But this affinity
for regulatory solutions does not often translate into an
affinity for antitrust enforcement. Rather, Harvard sees reg-
ulation by technocratic experts as the key to policing market
failures. Like Chicago, Harvard distrusts private antitrust
enforcers, generalist judges, and juries. In particular, the
Harvard school argues that antitrust intervention should be
kept to a minimum when there is an expert regulatory body
that could police the relevant market problem.
When the Chicago and Harvard schools line up — which
is the majority of the time these days, given the number of
markets that could be policed by regulators — the result is
almost always a defeat for antitrust enforcement. Consider the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pacific Bell v. linkLine,
which rejected a “price squeeze” theory of antitrust liability
— i.e., that a vertically integrated firm sold at high wholesale
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administration in office. The best example (although there are
many others) is the early New Deal, when the Roosevelt
administration virtually suspended antitrust law in favor of
governmentally mediated industry cartelization in a mis-
guided effort to fight the Depression. Although antitrust
enjoyed a brief revival between 1936 and 1940, with the out-
break of World War II antitrust enforcement came once again
to a grinding halt.
Even if economic crises in general and the current crisis in
particular bring about greater political demand for regulation,
the resulting regulation has not been greater antitrust enforce-
ment. Antitrust has been treated as a luxury for times of rel-
ative peace and prosperity. History suggests that Obama’s
antitrust enforcers will find it difficult to ride the current wave
of pro-regulatory sentiment.
Although Obama’s Antitrust Division has pledged not to
repeat fdr’s errors in responding to the Depression, histo-
ry suggests that the task will not be easy. Already there are
small signs that history may be repeating itself. In July, the
Department of Transportation approved Continental
Airlines’ request for antitrust immunity for its joining of the
Star Alliance. Varney objected to the request, arguing that it
could lead to rate increases of 6–15 percent. The inter-agency
disagreement reportedly became so heated that Larry
Summers, director of the White House Economic Council,
was called in to mediate, but at the end of the day
Transportation got its way, with a few small concessions to
the Justice Department.
Further, even through it is unlikely that the current crisis
will result in the complete suspension of antitrust enforce-
ment, it is almost inevitable that by the time the economy gets
back on its feet, many markets will have experienced a sig-
nificant increase in concentration because of the exit of firms
through bankruptcy. The administration can pledge to
enforce the antitrust laws as vigorously as it likes, but there
is nothing illegal about a firm finding its market position
enhanced by the financial failure of its rivals. Obama’s
antitrust enforcers may find themselves watching helplessly
as markets drift toward oligopoly.
HAS POST-CHICAGO MADE ITS CASE?
Assuming that the Obama administration overcomes the
Chicago and Harvard schools’ institutional reservations and
the dulling effects of the economic crisis, it will still face at
least one additional obstacle to Obama’s articulated goals of
enhanced antitrust enforcement: the intellectual case for a sig-
prices to a retail competitor and then charged a low retail
price. The majority opinion, written by Justice Roberts and
joined by the four other conservative justices, argued that price
squeezes are simply a combination of lawful refusals to deal
and lawful above-cost price cutting. The concurring opinion,
written by Justice Breyer and joined by the three more liber-
al justices, argued that price squeezes might be anticompet-
itive, but that the Federal Communications Commission
had regulatory authority to deter and remedy the anticom-
petitive harm and hence that a private lawsuit might cause
more harm than good. Chicago and Harvard thus lined up on
the outcome, albeit for quite different reasons. This pattern
has repeated itself many times in recent antitrust decisions.
Curiously, many members of the antitrust community —
that is to say, the community of present or former enforce-
ment officials, practicing lawyers, economists, and academ-
ics — continue to believe that the key to reinvigorated antitrust
enforcement is convincing the courts that the balance has
tipped too far in favor of dominant firms and that certain
business practices really do harm consumers. On a number
of occasions, I have heard senior antitrust enforcement offi-
cials (former and present) comment that no progress can be
made until the composition of the Supreme Court changes.
But in the current context, antitrust is not like abortion,
where a one- or two-justice shift could radically alter the bal-
ance. Modern antitrust law represents the alliance — albeit
mutually suspicious — of Chicago and Harvard. Since Breyer
joined the Court in 1994, the Supreme Court has decided 14
antitrust cases. In those cases, there have been 108 votes for
the majority position and only 14 votes in dissent. Breyer has
only been on the losing side twice, as often as Clarence
Thomas. Many of the decisions most reviled by the pro-
enforcement camp have been unanimous or nearly so. Even
if the antitrust views of Supreme Court nominees mattered
to presidents — and they do not — it would take decades to
break the Chicago-Harvard “double helix,” as former ftc
chair Bill Kovacic has called it.
ANTITRUST DURING CRISES
Obama’s antitrust enforcers may find the courts inhospitable
to any efforts to alter significantly the status quo of antitrust
enforcement, but they may also find resistance from forces
within the administration itself. As I have chronicled else-
where, since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, major
economic crises and wars have usually resulted in a substan-
tial diminution of antitrust enforcement, regardless of the
Modern antitrust law represents the alliance
— albeit mutually suspicious —
of the Chicago and Harvard schools.
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nificantly more aggressive approach to antitrust enforce-
ment still needs to be made.
For many years now, there has been talk in academic cir-
cles about a “post-Chicago” approach that will reverse the sup-
posedly laissez-faire ideology of the federal courts and
antitrust agencies and reinvigorate a robust antitrust jurispru-
dence and enforcement agenda. There are many “post-
Chicago” articles in the legal and economic literature. Some
of this scholarship makes a convincing case that aspects of
claims by some Chicago scholars were overstated. But the post-
Chicago literature fails to offer a comprehensive and coher-
ent case for a significant departure from the status quo.
There are at least two significant drawbacks to founding
an antitrust revolution on the post-Chicago literature. First,
the flavor of most of the literature is not to dispute Chicago’s
claims altogether but rather to say that those claims were over-
broad. For example, it now seems clear that the “monopoly
leverage fallacy” — the Chicago school claim that leveraging
market power in one market to a second market would be
unprofitable since the exercise of monopoly power in the
second market would encroach on the monopoly profits in
the first — was too broadly stated by some Chicago scholars.
Post-Chicago scholars have pointed out circumstances under
which monopoly leverage would be profitable. But they gen-
erally have not disputed Chicago’s central argument that
leveraging often would reduce the profitability of the first
monopoly and therefore be unappealing to the monopolist.
Most post-Chicago scholars recognize that the older, sim-
plistic monopoly leverage ideas that Chicago displaced were
misguided and that Chicago made vast improvements in
monopolization theory.
So much of the post-Chicago literature seeks to refine
and qualify the Chicago school arguments rather than to
displace them. Virtually no one wants to return to the pre-
Chicago world where horizontal mergers between small play-
ers were condemned, aggressive price cutting was viewed with
suspicion, merger efficiencies were a reason to condemn
mergers rather than to bless them, and vertical integration was
frowned on. Most post-Chicagoans want to tweak Chicago’s
arguments rather than to displace them. This is not the foun-
dation of an antitrust revolution, but of incremental adap-
tations to an ongoing program of economic research.
A second obstacle to using the post-Chicago literature as
the springboard for broad antitrust reform is that post-
Chicago has done little to demonstrate empirically a need for
more rigorous antitrust enforcement. There is an irony here:
post-Chicago scholars often criticize Chicagoans for being
overly theoretical and inattentive to real world facts, but post-
Chicago scholars are just as vulnerable to that criticism.
Indeed, many of post-Chicago’s central contributions have
been in game theory and behavioral accounts of market
behavior. While many of their models are plausible, plausi-
bility is not a strong enough justification for displacing the
status quo. One would like to know whether the models con-
form to the sorts of cases that routinely arise in the real
world and whether the prescribed remedies are capable of
improving consumer welfare.
In order to displace the dominant Chicago paradigm,
post-Chicago theorists need to go beyond poking technical
holes in Chicago school arguments and presenting counter-
theories. They need to offer an empirical case that the status
quo is failing the American consumer, and they need to craft
an affirmative agenda for antitrust enforcement. They also
need to justify the new agenda in light of the error costs of
over- and under-enforcement, including a consideration of the
institutional concerns previously discussed. Post-Chicago
has a long way to go to make that case.
President Obama’s antitrust ambitions face significant
obstacles in the courts, in Congress, in other regulatory agen-
cies, and in the market itself. The good news for the admin-
istration is that Obama’s senior appointments in both the ftc
and Department of Justice have been superb. Still, it will
take more than talent to bring about the sort of antitrust
revival that the administration seems to be promoting. It
will take attention to the institutionalist concerns that ani-
mate the Chicago-Harvard alliance in the courts, a helping
hand from a rebounding economy, and a robust analytical
framework for making the case that greater levels of antitrust
enforcement in merger and monopolization cases would
advance consumer welfare.
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Much of the post-Chicago literature seeks
to refine and qualify the Chicago school arguments
rather than to displace them.
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